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Abstract: Information and communication technologies provide immediate 
means, motivations and opportunities for cybercrime. However, deeper cultural, 
social and psychological developments triggered by globalisation are the root 
causes of such motivations and opportunities. Successful strategies to prevent 
cybercrime cannot focus only on technological or infrastructural defences 
but must address these global developments. While scientifc understanding 
and political awareness of such causes are still limited, studies from diferent 
disciplines, including sociology, criminology and psychology, allow to detect 
some global criminogenic paterns and to identify the state responsibilities 
of national governments for failing to address them adequately. Tis article 
integrates the fndings of these studies to provide a preliminary interdisciplinary 
theory of the global causes of cybercrime and assess what national governments 
can do to mitigate them. 
Keywords: cybercrime, cybersecurity, global crime, globalization, crime prevention, 
anomie, hacking community, terrorism, extremism, hate crime 
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1. Introduction 
Cybercrimes are defned by the use of information and communication 
technology (ICT). One popular defnition divides them into (1) crimes where 
a computer is a target, (2) crimes where a computer is a tool, (3) crimes where 
a computer plays an incidental role (Goodman 1997, 468-469; Broadhurst 
2006, 413; Casey 2011, xxiv-xxv; Brenner 2012, 13). An even more efective 
defnition (McGuire and Dowling 2013, 5; HM Government 2016, 17) 
distinguishes cyber-dependent crimes, which can only be commited through 
the use of ICT devices – such as developing and spreading malware – from 
cyber-enabled crimes, which are traditional crimes that can be increased in 
scale or reach by the use of ICT – such as computer fraud, data thef or sexual 
ofending. Te constitutive or transformational (Wall 2007) role of ICT might 
easily divert the focus of researchers and policymakers from the social and 
psychological causes of cybercrime. Tese are, of course, difcult to study, 
rooted as they are in the most complex human (cultural, socio-psychological, 
political, economic) developments of globalisation and their local variations. 
And they might be perceived as difcult to tackle, since they are ofen out 
of the direct control of individual nation-states. At a policy level, these 
difculties might translate into reductive conceptions of cybercrime and 
cybersecurity, whereby cybercrime is perceived as an evil to be fought, and 
security is conceived as stronger technological defences and infrastructures, 
rather than adequate societal conditions to enable the individual to thrive 
without having to resort to crime. Tis seems to be the case, for instance, 
of the United Kingdom’s (UK) National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 
(HM Government 2016), which is mostly focused on infrastructural and 
technological measures. Disabling technological means and opportunities is 
necessary, but not sufcient. Any efective preventive strategy should aim 
at removing or at least mitigating all the possible causes of crime, including 
those rooted in global developments. Without a clear understanding of these 
and a coherent plan to address them, any defensive action at a national level 
becomes an “exercise in shooting in the dark” that may produce adverse side 
efects (cf. Passas 2000, 16). In the recent years, many jurisdictions, including 
the EU, the US, the UK, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, India, 
and Japan, have adopted cybersecurity strategies. More are likely to follow. 
Tere is, therefore, an urgent need to improve our understanding of the 
causes of cybercrime to assess and, if necessary, reform existing strategies 
and design new ones. 
Converging fndings from diferent disciplines, including sociology, 
criminology and psychology, allow to identify at least some of such causes. 
49 
Journal of Ethics and Legal Technologies – Volume 2(1) – April 2020
Tis article draws upon such literature to trace a preliminary interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework on the causes of cybercrime which can be useful 
for local governments to assess their policies and/or develop new ones. 
Hopefully, our analysis will contribute to the understanding of the causes 
of global crime at large, of which cybercrime is a paradigmatic expression. 
Te article also aims to trigger further discussion on the need to adopt a 
more holistic interdisciplinary perspective on the causes of cybercrime (and 
crime in general). In the next paragraph, we will outline the methodology 
and limitations of our research. Te third paragraph will review relevant 
interdisciplinary literature on cybercrime, global crime and globalisation to 
identify the main global causes of cybercrime. Te fourth paragraph will 
critically discuss such fndings and propose policy recommendations for 
States. In the fnal paragraph, we will draw our conclusions. 
2. Methodology and limitations 
Te causes of crime have been studied from the most diferent disciplinary 
angles, yet they are still a source of lively debates – even more so when it 
comes to unprecedented forms of global criminality. Te difculty of fnding 
a conclusive general theory, however, is more revealing than discouraging. 
Te variety of explanatory frameworks speaks loudly of one fundamental 
character of the problem: its complexity. Te causes of crime – especially 
of global crime – are multiple, diverse and mutually interdependent. Tis 
is the inevitable consequence of crime being a human behaviour, as such 
resulting from an innumerable, ever-changing and ofen unpredictable 
series of psychological, social, environmental and even biological conditions. 
Atempts to provide unilateral (monodisciplinary) explanations of crime are 
bound to fail. Simplifcation and intuition are deceiving and dangerous, as 
they can lead to ofender stigmatisation and unreasonable policymaking. 
Te only way to build a sensible understanding of the causes of crime is 
through an integrated dialogue between diferent disciplines. Te approach 
of this article will be, therefore, as interdisciplinary as possible. Te well-
consolidated criminological distinction between criminal motivations and 
opportunities will provide the spine of our theoretical framework. Te 
further distinction between remote and proximate causes of global crime, 
which we articulated in previous studies (Pasculli 2020; Pasculli and Ryder 
2020), will add structure to it. Tis framework will be then integrated with 
converging and mutually complementary social and psychological fndings 
on globalisation – such as anomie and strain theories, Bauman’s or Gidden’s 
analysis of modernity and the fndings of the emerging social psychology of 
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globalisation – and on more specifc aspects or forms of cybercrime – such 
as Holt’s, Steinmetz’s and Rogers’s studies on the hacking subculture. 
Our analysis presents inevitable limitations. Te nature and economy of 
this work do not allow to address all the causes of cybercrime. Instead, we will 
focus on some of the most signifcant social and psychological developments 
of globalisation. Criminogenic factors concerning the individual or specifc 
national contexts are beyond the scope of our analysis. On the other hand, 
our interest is to assess what national governments can do to mitigate some 
of the global causes of cybercrime. Terefore, our recommendations will 
be limited to national policies, excluding international action. Nor could 
we even atempt to cite all the literature on the many issues related to 
cybercrime and globalisation that we are going to deal with. Instead, we will 
base our analysis on well-established and largely agreed theories or other 
emerging and convincing theories, possibly based on empirical fndings. 
Te paper remains largely speculative in nature and, as such, it’s open to 
criticism, integration and further development. In particular, more empirical 
research would be required to confrm (or disprove) some of our theoretical 
and policy suggestions. 
3. Te global causes of cybercrime 
If global crime is any crime which is globalised in its causes, means, 
forms of perpetration, and/or efects (Pasculli 2015), then cybercrime is a 
paradigmatic manifestation of it, as its causes, means, forms of perpetration 
and efects are deeply rooted in the developments of globalisation (cf., for 
instance, UNODC 2013, 5; Grabosky 2001, 243 and 247; Loeb 2004a and 
2004b; Pocar 2004, 28). Information technology is one of these developments, 
but it is neither the only nor necessarily the most signifcant one, as we shall 
see. Before we go any further, let us set out our theoretical framework on the 
causes of global crime. 
Tere are two main categories of causes of global and cybercrime: proximate 
causes and remote ones. Proximate causes are personal and situational factors 
that infuence directly individual behaviour. Tese include motivations and 
opportunities (cf. Cantor and Land 1985; Coleman 1987 and 1992; Grabosky 
2001; Broadhurst 2006; Clarke 2008; Kigerl 2011). Motivations are symbolic 
constructions that defne certain goals and activities as desirable (Coleman 
1987, 409). Opportunities are situations, such as access to suitable targets, 
availability of means or the absence of efective controls (cf., for instance, 
Grabosky 2001, 248; Cohen and Felson 1979, 588-608), that make certain 
behaviours possible (Coleman 1992, 828) or more tempting (Clarke 2008, 
179). Remote causes are the deeper cultural, socio-psychological, economic, 
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and politico-institutional developments – as such, largely independent from 
individual choices or particularly circumscribed contexts – that determine 
or aggravate individual motivations and situational opportunities for crime. 
Te boundaries between proximate and remote causes are blurred, as remote 
causes ofen develop into proximate ones. In the following paragraphs, we 
will provide an overview of some of the most signifcant remote social and 
psychological causes of global crime and cybercrime as identifed by existing 
literature. For each of these causes, we will address the transversal role of 
technology in enabling or amplifying criminogenic efects. 
3.1. Global anomie, strains and cybercrime 
One of the most powerful theoretical frameworks to explain crime is the 
anomie theory. Anomie (“normlessness”) is the situation in which society 
fails to regulate the naturally unlimited desires of individuals. According 
to Durkheim, this state is typical of periods of great change, when society 
cannot instantaneously adjust individual passions to new (beter or worse) 
standards of living (Durkheim 1897, 213). Anomie has become chronic in 
business and trade with industrial development and the “almost infnite” 
extension of the market (ibid�, 216). Te commitment of every nation, 
irrespective of the economic model adopted, to industrial prosperity and the 
consequent subordination of the state to economic life have liberated human 
desires of any restraining regulation and fostered unlimited greed (ibid�). 
Merton has argued that unrealistic goals are not necessarily biological, 
but can be the result of social and cultural pressures. Tis happens when 
there is an unbalance between culturally-induced goals of success and the 
institutional means to achieve them. When there is an excessive cultural 
emphasis on wealth, power, status etc., but legitimate and efective means 
of ataining them are not available, individuals might turn to prohibited 
but efective means. Anti-social behaviour is, thus, induced by the class 
structure that prevents equal access to lawful opportunities for pursuing 
conventional cultural goals (Merton 1938 and 1968). Durkheim’s anomie 
refers to the normlessness of the goals, Merton’s refers to the normlessness 
of the means (Agnew 1997, 37). Messner and Rosenfeld have pointed out that 
removing structural obstacles to legitimate opportunities is not enough to 
reduce crime rates when all the major social institutions primarily support 
the quest for material success and fail to promote alternative defnitions of 
self-worth and achievement (Messner and Rosenfeld 1997 and 2013; Chamlin 
and Cochran 1995). In other words, the cultural goals must be questioned, 
together with the adequacy of the means (Orrù 1987; Bernburg 2002). 
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Anomie theory is gradually expanding beyond its original sociological 
focus. Robert Agnew has moved the analysis from the macro-level of the 
social system to the socio-psychological level of the individual and their 
immediate environment. Expanding Merton’s theory and drawing upon 
works by Albert Cohen (1955 and 1965) and Cloward and Ohlin (1960), 
Agnew developed a general strain theory of crime, whereby delinquency 
would depend upon the strain resulting not only from the failure to 
achieve positively valued goals but also from the inability to escape legally 
from painful situations (Agnew 1990, 1997 and 2005). A recent study by 
Teymoori, Bastian and Jeten (2017) has initiated a psychological analysis 
of anomie. Most importantly, anomie theory has progressively shifed from 
a nation-centred perspective – well exemplifed by Merton’s and Messner 
and Rosenfeld’s focus on the American Dream – to a cross-national one. 
Recent empirical studies on large samples of diferent nations have 
investigated several aspects of anomie theory, such as the efects of social 
structure (Schaible and Altheimer 2015), rapid societal change (Zhao and 
Cao 2010), formalised social controls (Swader 2017), or even globalisation 
itself (Levchak 2015). Anomie theory or its derivatives are also being used 
to explain typical forms of globalised crime such as transnational fnancial 
and corporate crime (Passas 1990 and 2000), terrorism (Agnew 2010), refugee 
criminality (Simmler, Plassard, Schär and Schuster 2017), and online piracy 
(Larsson, Svensson and de Kaminski 2012). Passas (2000) observes that the 
structural problems typical of anomie are being reproduced throughout 
the world through globalism and neoliberalism. Like the American Dream, 
global neoliberalism fails to deliver its promises. Global interconnectedness 
and neoliberal discourses of economic growth, free markets, individualism, 
consumerism, privatisation and deregulation have created new needs, 
desires and fashions. International and national institutions, however, fail 
to provide equal legal means to pursue such goals of welfare (cf. Stiglitz 
2002 and 2012). Instead, structural “asymmetries” (Passas 2000, 17-18) in 
economy, law, politics and culture aggravate the divergence between means 
and ends, which produces a sense of deprivation and frustration in those 
who fail to achieve the globally valued goals of success. Such strains can 
induce deviance of various types, particularly in the presence of criminal 
motives and opportunities (ibid�, 18). Te combination of the anomic state 
(remote cause) and individual and situational criminogenic factors (proximate
causes) produces global crime. 
Two caveats. First, acknowledging inequality and insufciency of means to 
achieve culturally valued goals as a cause of globalised forms of criminality 
does not imply that poverty, as such, is a cause of global crime. In fact, 
societies afected by poverty, characterised by a very rigid social structure 
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(Merton 1938, 680) and less materialistic goals (Passas 2000, 26), are more 
immune from the criminogenic efects of anomie, than those who are beter 
of. Durkheim explains very clearly that poverty is a restraint in itself, for 
desires depend on resources: “Te less one has the less he is tempted to 
extend the range of his needs indefnitely” (Durkheim 1897, 214). It is those 
who do have access to material opportunities that are easily pressured 
into achieving more and more. Te expansion of economic opportunities 
reinforces the emphasis of goals of material success and provide new 
means to achieve them illegally. Other than fnancial crime, cybercrime is a 
paradigmatic example of this. Cybercriminals are rarely poor and uneducated, 
as cybercrime requires access to ICT and advanced skills (Neufeld 2010, 5). 
Moreover, access to the Internet increases exposure to relentless cultural 
pressures of consumerism, competition, and individualism. Second, the 
anomic strains triggered by globalisation do not explain only fnancially-
motivated crime but can instigate other forms of criminality (Levchak 
2015). Tis applies also to cybercrime. Although many cybercrimes are 
moved by monetary gain, or business benefts (Holt and Kilger 2012, 802) 
– empirical research suggests that the second most common motivation 
for computer crimes is revenge (Neufeld 2010). Shaw’s review of empirical 
evidence on insider computer atacks reveals that “disgruntled” ofenders 
are generally undergoing signifcant personal and professional strains. Pre-
existing individual vulnerabilities can determine maladaptive behavioural 
and emotional reactions to such strains, but management failures to address 
the issue properly can escalate the process leading to ofending (Shaw 2006, 
25). Shaw cites the example of a young help desk worker with signifcant 
frustrations caused by a long history of difcult international moves caused 
by family fnancial stresses, the divorce of his parents, and the struggle to 
complete his training. His frustrations in the workplace began to mount 
rapidly when he felt he did not receive the recognition he was entitled to. 
He did not voice this to management, and his inconsistencies at work led to 
his being placed on probation before commiting a cyberatack. In a lengthy 
memorandum, he wrote that managers must learn to handle hackers in the 
work environment diferently than regular employees, indicating that he 
felt entitled to special treatment (ibid.). Tis research suggests once again 
that the emphasis on personal success is ofen neither compensated by an 
equal emphasis on alternative goals of self-worth and acceptable ways to 
achieve them, nor supported by efective legitimate means and opportunities 
to pursue it – such as fnancial and family stability, support and recognition 
at work, but also social and psychological support to deal with personal 
frustrations and vulnerabilities. Tis can expose the individual to various 
strains, which, in turn, can generate criminal behaviours, not necessarily 
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motivated by the will to achieve the goals illegally, but also by the anger and 
frustration deriving from negative stimuli (or the removal of positive ones), 
as suggested by Agnew (2010). 
What is the role of ICT in all this? ICT magnifes global anomie, 
corroborates the individual strains and motivations that derive from it and 
provides new criminal opportunities. Te global reach of communications 
facilitates the worldwide circulation of consumerist goals and unrealistic 
aspirations of material success and prestige. At the same time, cyberspace 
dilutes social and legal norms that regulate individual desires and the means 
to satisfy them. Social norms are weakened in the global virtual reality of 
the Internet, which disconnects people from their local communities and 
estrange them from each other (Passas 2000, 25; Giddens 1990, 21). Te virtual 
nature of cyberspace also makes efective legal regulation difcult, both at 
a national and at an international level (Rowland 1998). All this can incite 
individual criminal motivations. Moreover, ICT ofers efective illegal means
and opportunities to pursue globally valued goals of success, when socially 
acceptable and institutionalised ones are missing. Te digital avenues to do 
so are many, inexpensive and readily available: online fle-sharing systems, 
peer-to-peer sofware, disruptive malware, fraudulent emails and websites, 
underground virtual marketplaces, as was Silk Road (Phelps and Wat 2014) 
etc. Te anonymity of such instruments and the availability of encrypting 
tools to cover illegal activities, such as fle sharing (Larsson, Svensson and de 
Kaminski 2012), further encourage criminal motivations and opportunities 
by making detection more difcult. 
3.2. Anxiety, fear, hate and terror 
Te global era is an era of irrationalisation and “insécurisation” (Mathieu
1995) – or “uncertainization” (Bauman 1997, 203). Te post-war individual,
overwhelmed by the experience of the atrocities of war and totalitarianism
and fulflled with feelings of alienation, anxiety, “nothingness” and absurd,
was invested by an existential crisis widely investigated by philosophy
and psychology, and expressed by literature and arts (Pasculli 2015). Tese
feelings have gradually eroded the trust on the power of human reason to
order and regulate social life which had characterised the centuries following
the Enlightenment. Irrational, instinctive or emotional perceptions of
reality foster a sense of insecurity even in societies which, as Castel (2003,
5) and Bauman (2006, 129) observe, are the most secure in the history of
humanity. Globalisation has aggravated this crisis. Global mobility and
interconnectedness have brought together people from the most diferent
cultures rather suddenly and without any cultural preparation to contact
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with diversity and the emerging global culture. Fear, mistrust and suspicion
towards the diverse grow out of post-war insecurity and irrationality
and individuals withdraw into localism and traditional values – ofen
the product of nostalgic misconceptions. Te rapidity of change and the
increasing subordination of individual to organisations are other reasons for
psychological discontent, as Bertrand Russell observed back in 1949. Changes
– also in technology – happen too quickly for individuals (Russell 1949, 1310)
and societies (Durkheim 1897, 213) to be able to adjust properly. Te rising
power of impersonal global forces, such as fnancial markets or multinational
corporations, worsens the sense of impotence of the individual. Te nation-
states’ physiological incapability of governing global phenomena furthers the
perception that no one is in control (Bauman 1998) and nurtures mistrust
and anger. Te recent waves of populism and nationalism are manifestations
of all this. Te openness of societies becomes “the terrifying experience of
heteronomous, vulnerable populations overwhelmed by forces they neither
control nor truly understand” (Bauman 2006, 96). 
Both hate crimes and international terrorism seem to be rooted in intergroup
conficts (Mills, Freilich and Chermak 2017, 1197) caused or deepened by
globalisation and the failure of states to adequately support and prepare their
citizens to its sudden and revolutionary changes. Research in the emerging
feld of the social psychology of globalisation suggests that emotional and
refexive responses to intercultural contacts and the emerging global culture –
characterised as new, individualist, competitive, scientifc and result-oriented,
as opposed to traditional local cultures – lead to exclusionary reactions (Chiu,
Gries, Torelli and Cheng 2011). Te fear that global culture will contaminate
local culture – so-called “contamination anxiety” (ibid�, 668) – can result
in direct atacks against or the isolation of individuals or elements of the
contaminating culture. Sociological research confrms that racially motivated
crimes rise when racial and ethnic minority groups move into areas populated
by white people and are determined by the perceived need to “defend the
neighbourhood” from the perceived threat to the majority’s interests posed
by the minority (Green, Strolovitch and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007). Tese
psychological and sociological fndings are in line with criminological studies
that describe hate crime as a mechanism of power and oppression atempting
to re-create both the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the
perpetrator’s group and the “appropriate” subordinate identity of the victim’s
group (Perry 2001). Criminological research also confrms that ofen contact
with diversity alone triggers hate crime, regardless of any hate or prejudice
towards specifc minorities. Relying on consistent literature, Chakraborti
and Garland point out that many hate crimes are motivated merely by the
vulnerability and the diference of their victims, perceived by hate ofenders
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as undesirable and easy targets. Examples include the homeless, the elderly,
members of alternative subcultures etc. (Chakraborti and Garland 2012).
Incidentally, empirical data collected by Mills, Freilich and Chermak (2017)
disprove a causal relationship between poverty as such and hate crimes and
demonstrate that these are more common in areas which are less poor but
are experiencing worsening economic conditions and higher unemployment
rates over time. Tis also confrms the emergence of anomic strains in times
of change. More comprehensive ideological rebellions to the materialistic,
and largely Western-like, values and goals of the emerging global culture can
lead to also violent atempts to introduce a “new social order” (cf. Merton
1938, 677-678). Aggressive foreign politics, marginalising internal policies
and the xenophobia nurtured by populist and nationalist rhetoric can act as
proximate causes of terrorist atacks by fuelling criminal motivations. 
Tese dynamics are inevitably exasperated by ICT. Cyberspace allows virtual
contacts between people from diverse cultures, which would be impossible or
very unlikely in the real world because of geographical distance. Te media
and the Internet amplify feelings of fear, anger and insecurity, which are an
easy way to atract public atention, promote ideological agendas or gain
in sales, “clicks”, or “likes” (Bauman 2006, 96). Moreover, as psychologists
observe, exclusionary responses are highly contagious and the Internet is a
powerful means to spread them (Chieu, Gries, Torelli and Cheng 2011, 673).
Messages of hate, bigotry, fear, mistrust, xenophobia posted on social media
can reach millions of people around the world. Extremist or terrorist groups
can systematically disseminate their propaganda and recruit afliates through
dedicated websites and social networks, such as the white supremacist website
stormfront.org and the neo-Nazi social network “for people of European
descent” Newsaxon (Holt 2012, 341-343). Finally, while cyber-terrorist atacks
might still be rare (Helms, Costanza and Johnson 2011), the use of computer
technology by terrorists to communicate, plan and organise atacks, as well
as the connections between hacking and terrorism (Holt 2012, 343-345), are
well documented (Broadhurst 2006). 
3.3. Lost identities 
In increasingly globalised societies, identities and social relations
are disembodied from local contexts of interactions. Living in a global
world means doing things and identifying oneself at a distance. Tis is
what Giddens (1990) calls “disembedding” and Bauman (2000 and 2007)
“liquidity”. In such a context, it becomes very difcult for institutions to
give stable identities to “mobile and versatile populations” (Franko Aas
2013, 177-178). Cyberspace is perhaps the most typical expression of these
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processes. Research in psychiatry suggests that the Internet transforms
human functioning, personhood and identity, with important implications
for knowledge and consciousness (Kirmayer, Raikhel and Rahimi 2013, 167).
Anonymous virtual interactions are experienced as liberating and ofer the
opportunity to craf one’s own identity free from the constraints of material
reality (Jewkes and Sharp 2003, 3). But there are various side-efects. In
the frst place, cyberspace can reinforce motivations to commit cybercrime.
Te virtual and anonymous nature of cyberspace lowers the perception of
victims and of efective legal and social controls (the likelihood of being
detected and punished), as suggested by psychology and criminology (see
for instance Hinduja 2008, 396; Holt and Kilger 2012, 799). As a consequence,
online behaviour – or at least certain types of behaviour – can be more
disinhibited than in real life. Secondly, the Internet contributes to the
diferentiation of groups and amplifes the perception of group cohesion and
normative support to individual behaviours, which is integral to extremist
violence (Mills, Freilich and Chermak 2017, 1197-1199). Cyberspace can,
therefore, facilitate the identifcation with virtual subcultures, such as the
hacking community, as we will see in the next paragraph, or extremist
and terrorist ideologies (Kirmayer, Raikhel and Rahimi 2013, 172). Here,
individuals looking for an identity, under the strains of dominant cultural
goals perceived as oppressive, easily fnd in radical or otherwise deviant
ideologies new values to embrace, new ideals to live up to, new causes
to support. Tis is the case, for instance, of the radicalisation of British
citizens (Townsend 2016), also from non-Muslim backgrounds, such as the
Greenwich-born punk singer Sally Jones (Weaver 2017). Tus, together with
global mobility, ICT plays a crucial role in the processes of radicalisation.
Sally Jones herself – it is reported – used various social media accounts
to recruit women to Isis and provided practical advice on how to travel to
Syria (ibid�). 
3.4. Te hacking community and the quest for identity, recognition 
and adventure 
Te hacking community is a deviant subculture developed around
technology (Holt 2010) but ultimately driven by deeper socio-psychological
factors. Hackers are not a homogeneous group. Tey are highly diversifed
in motivations and skill, as suggested by Rogers’s successful taxonomy
(newbies, cyberpunks, old guard hackers, internals, pety thieves,
professional criminals and information warriors: Rogers 2006). Despite
such variations, scholars from diferent disciplines agree that the hacking
community is characterised by specifc cultural elements (Steinmetz 2015
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and 2016) which defne its collective identity (Jordan and Taylor 1998, 762).
An integrated analysis of the also empirical and ethnographic fndings
of various studies reveals the main components of such identity. Tese
are (1) technology; (2) skills; (3) mentality; (4) transgressiveness/moral
disengagement; (5) low perception of formal and informal sanctions. Te
frst element is an “all-consuming” relationship with technology (ibid., 
763). Hackers conceive technology as something to be turned to new and
unexpected uses – the so-called “hacks” and “cracks” (Holt 2010, 471-472).
Te focus is, therefore, not on technology itself, but on the labour required
to manipulate it – the hacking process. Steinmetz notes that hackers share
a “sense of ownership” over technological tools and the act of labour itself
(Steinmetz, 2015, 127, 133-134). To perform such labour, another essential
element is required: skills. Technical skills defne hackers (Rogers 2006)
and their hierarchy (Jordan and Taylor 1998, 768; Holt 2010, 474). Guild-
like learning structures (ofen secret: Jordan and Taylor 1998, 768) are
in place (Steinmetz, 2015, 134-135). To gain status, novices must devote
themselves to learning from more experienced hackers in a sort of master-
apprentice relationship (Steinmetz 2015) or from the collective wisdom of
the community available online (Jordan and Taylor 1998, 764). Hackers
see skills as the product of commitment, development and training, rather
than raw talent (Steinmetz 2015, 132-133, 135). Te creative approach to
technology and the emphasis on technical skills reveal the next important
component of the hacking community: a specifc mentality characterised a
problem-solving orientation and systematic and technical but at the same
time creative and unconventional thinking (ibid�, 130-132). Hackers are
moved by curiosity and an appetite for exploration (Holt 2017 and 2010,
475; Jordan and Taylor 1998, 768). Tey crave for the thrill of the hacking
process and the liberating emotional reward of a successful hack (Jordan
and Taylor 1998, 768-769; Steinmetz 2015, 136-137). Te gratifcation is
such that it overshadows the frustrations and risks of the process. Tis goes
together with another defning element of the hacking subculture, which is
transgressiveness, if not moral disengagement. Tis is fuelled not only by
rationalisations of hacking as an act of creative resistance (Steinmetz 2015,
139-140) or even as a socially useful activity (Young, Zhang and Prybutok
2007, 285) but also by a low perception of both formal and informal
sanctions. Tese perceptions are facilitated by the peculiar environment of
the hacking community, which is mostly virtual and relatively isolated from
the real world and subject to very diferent rules and controls. Hackers are
not afraid of being socially excluded for their actions, as they are rewarded
with the recognition and respect from their peers. And since the regulation
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and the formal controls on online activities are not as uniform and certain
as in real life, their deterrent efect is rather limited (ibid�, 285-286). 
Te sharing of sofware and knowledge by the members of the hacking
community expands criminal opportunities and strengthens criminal
motivations. Nevertheless, the ultimate reasons that determine hackers to
commit cybercrimes are not necessarily a product of the hacking subculture.
Although media representations and popular stereotypes have made of
hackers the “archetypal ‘cybercriminal’” (Wall 2007, 46), the criminal element
is not what characterises hacking as a subculture (Steinmetz 2015, 126 and
2016). Tere are, indeed, hackers who have no criminal intent (“ethical
hackers” or “white hats”). Teir actions are motivated by ethical purposes,
such as exposing the security faws of computer systems or programming
open-source sofware. Ethical hacking has become a proper profession
and training, certifcations and university degrees are available around the
world (Caldwell 2011). To fnd what motivates hackers to engage in criminal
behaviour we need, therefore, to look outside the hacking community. Some
criminal hackers are motivated by fnancial gain. If so, anomie and strains
theory might apply. But this is not always the case. Trill- and sensation-
seeking, the curiosity of exploration, the lust for adventure, and the need
for peer appreciation can be more powerful motivators (cf. Jordan and
Taylor 1998, 759-760 and 767-769). Trill- and sensation-seeking are well-
known criminal motivations (see Zuckerman 1974, 1994 and 2007; Baldwin
1985 and 1990; Burt and Simons 2013). Globalisation can reinforce them.
In a world increasingly dominated by business and fnance the everyday
life of many people does not present many opportunities for idleness and
adventure. Most individuals spend their day at work, ofen indoors, where
individual impulses must be strictly controlled. Even outside the working
environment, opportunities for excitement are very limited and mostly
reserved to those who have more time and money to invest on travels and
thrilling activities such as skydiving, motorcycling etc. (Russell 1949, 1310;
Burt and Simons 2013, 1342-1343). ICT ofers a cheap and readily available
opportunity to engage in new forms of “rough play” and risky behaviours,
with the additional beneft that in the virtual reality of cyberspace no
physical strength is required and there are no perceived immediate physical
consequences to wear of the excitement (cf. Baldwin 1985, 1327). Tis also
confrms some of our previous conclusions on the impact of socioeconomic
diferences on cybercrime. Entry to hacking communities is inevitably
denied to those living in poverty, with no access to ICT and very low levels
of education. It is rather those who can access ICT and have a good level of
schooling, but limited resources to satisfy their needs for stimulation who
may turn to hacking (cf. Farley and Farley 1972; Robertson 1992). Te need
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for thrill is coupled with the need for peer recognition and appreciation and,
more broadly, the quest for identity. Te hacking community ofers all this.
It allows the development of new forms of identity beyond national and
physical boundaries and fulfls the human need to progress in a communal
way of life and recognise the same commitment in others members of the
community (Jordan and Taylor 1998, 763). Te identifcation with the values
of the hacking community (so-called “hacker ethic”) and the support of the
other members can reinforce criminal motivations (cf. Levy 1984; Himanen
2001; Brown 2008). Criminal hacking is not, therefore, a direct product of
hacking subculture but yet another expression of the incapability of national
institutions to provide individuals with stable non-virtual identities and
the means to pursue gratifying lifestyles in the context of increasingly
globalising societies. 
4. Discussion and policy recommendations 
Te above analysis suggests that technology sits at a particular junction
in the causation of global crime. ICT expands criminal opportunities, by
providing means for criminal behaviours and access to new criminal targets
in a mostly anonymous virtual environment (cyberspace) particularly
difcult to control. ICT also strengthens criminal motivations by spreading
and amplifying cultural goals, strains and anxieties brought about by
globalisation and by facilitating the online dissemination and consolidation
of criminogenic ideas and identities. But many of the opportunities and
motivations for cybercrime originate in deeper socio-psychological
developments, ofen related to the inability of nation-states to appropriately
control the criminogenic impact of globalisation. In other words, ICT is
never the ultimate cause of cybercrime, but it enables remote causes to turn
into proximate ones, making the risks of cybercrime more concrete. Any
successful strategy to prevent cybercrime should, therefore, address not
only the means but also the causes. And not only proximate causes but also
remote ones. 
Proximate causes are relatively easy to detect and tackle, as suggested
by the overall positive experience of situational crime prevention (Clarke
1980, 1995, 2008 and 2012). Te infrastructural and technological defences
proposed by most local cybersecurity strategies are a good example of this.
Remote causes can be more difcult to eradicate, particularly when they
depend on socio-cultural, political, or fnancial evolutions which are out of
the direct control of the state. However, difculties should not be exaggerated,
as this can end up in deresponsibilising local governments. Indeed, the
above-mentioned research provides sufcient evidence to identify some of
61 
Journal of Ethics and Legal Technologies – Volume 2(1) – April 2020
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
such causes and reveals that these are ofen aggravated by state action or
inertia. Appropriate policies should be adopted by national governments to
fulfl their duty-responsibility to mitigate the criminogenic impact of global
developments in their jurisdiction. Every relevant policy should include
a specifc section on the possible responsibilities of the government for
engendering or aggravating both proximate and remote causes of crime and
should identify the possible remedies. (Of course, international action is
also required, but this goes beyond the scope of this article). We will outline
below some policy recommendations broad enough to be used to assess
existing cybersecurity strategies in any national jurisdiction and, hopefully,
to support the drafing of new ones. It will become soon evident that many
of these recommendations could be helpful also to prevent global crime in
general. 
4.1. Interdisciplinary research and dialogue between academia and
practice 
Uncontroversial scientifc evidence of the causal correlations between
global developments and global forms of criminality can be very difcult to
gather. Tis, however, is not a valid reason to dismiss the remote causes of
crime from prevention policies. On the contrary, it is an excellent reason to
promote further interdisciplinary and comparative research. 
A. States should invest in research not only on technology but also on the
causes and forms of manifestation of cybercrime, with a particular focus
on cultural, social, psychological and behavioural developments related to
globalisation. Government-funded research projects on the causes of crime
should always be (i) interdisciplinary, (ii) comparative, (iii) international
and (iv) pluralistic. Scholars from any relevant discipline – psychology,
criminology, law, history, natural sciences – and from diferent institutions
should be involved to allow cross-verifcation and mutual integration of
fndings. Research should address also foreign contexts, frameworks and
models, also through the collaboration with international partners and
institutions. 
B. Every cybersecurity policy should be based on the most solid of such
research fndings and should indicate the scientifc frameworks on which
it relies. Peer-reviewed academic works should be preferred to unverifed
open sources. Panels of experts from diferent backgrounds and institutions
should be involved in the process of policy-drafing to advise on the quality
of the sources utilised. Governments should promote, through consultations,
workshops, roundtables etc., an ongoing dialogue between academia and
practice – the judiciary, law enforcement, probation ofcers, policymakers
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etc. Governments should resort to freelance or private consultancy frms
with caution – as these might be driven by their own agendas or external
infuences. Whenever possible, universities and recognised research
institutions should be preferred. Tese are beter placed to ofer impartial
and high-quality research based on verifable scientifc methods. 
C. Where research fndings are insufcient or contradictory, governments
should abstain from adopting any action, according to the principle of
precaution, and commission further research by academic institutions. 
4.2. Resolving anomie: social equality, welfare and human values 
Anomic strains call for interventions on two diferent levels: the
appropriateness of the means to achieve culturally valued goals and the
appropriateness of the goals themselves. Acting on the means requires
interventions to reduce social inequality. Promoting global equality and
welfare is, therefore, a priority. Tis is not only a remit of international
institutions: states have important duties and responsibilities too. National
governments must commit to detecting and measuring national social
inequality and appropriate welfare measures to provide equal access
to personal, professional, social, fnancial, and technological means
and opportunities. Tis should be accompanied by initiatives to develop
appropriate social and legal norms to encourage the acceptable and
responsible use of the means and opportunities available. 
Acting on the goals implies a continuing refection by local policymakers
on the cultural values promoted by society and its institutions. In their
policies, strategies and regulation, national governments should place more
emphasis on notions of self-worth and self-achievement more adherent
to the individual rights and responsibilities stemming from human
dignity than the mere pursuit of social prestige and fnancial success.
Particular stress should be placed on physical and mental wellbeing,
self-awareness and positive social interactions as a necessary condition
for the full enjoyment of fundamental human rights. International legal
instruments expressing global commitment to such rights, such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, should be the legal and cultural foundations
of national policies. If this becomes common practice worldwide, it would
also help consolidate a global consensus on the common nucleus of values
proclaimed by those instruments. Te centrality of individual values and
rights does not equate to individualism. On the contrary, the universal
recognition of the human person as the foundation of a global system of
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values implies the acknowledgement of the mutual moral, social and legal
duties and responsibilities of individuals, social formations and nations.
Te pursuit of individual opportunity and wellbeing should be therefore
always counterbalanced by an equal emphasis on solidarity, mutual
respect, tolerance, inclusivity, integration, honesty, legality, integrity, and
accountability as foundational principles of the human society. 
4.3. Education and mental wellbeing 
Some psychological criminogenic factors triggered by globalisation,
including anomic strains, anxiety, insecurity and fear can be mitigated
through education and measures to promote physical and mental wellbeing.
Together, these can be a formidable avenue to develop, at an individual level,
self-awareness, rationality, critical thinking, realistic ambitions, inclusivity,
a meaningful sense of identity and a culture of legality and integrity, which
can gradually grow, at a collective level, into a beter social regulation of
cultural goals and the acceptable means to achieve them. 
A. Governments should invest not only in teaching technical knowledge
and skills to be deployed in the defence from cybercrime, but also in advancing
(i) critical and independent thinking, and knowledge and understanding
of (ii) human psychology and human behaviour; (iii) relationships, sex,
physical and mental wellbeing; (iv) the rule of law, human rights and
other fundamental social values supported by international law and the
international community; (v) globalisation and its cultural and socio-
psychological implications, including those caused by the contact with
diversity. Such provision should be mandatory at all levels of education
– including higher education and professional training – and it should be
monitored, revised and updated periodically. 
B. Te teaching of computing in schools should focus not only on the
safe and respectful use of ICT but also on issues related to the hacking
subculture to counter both the glorifcation of criminal hackers and the
unfair labelling of all hackers as criminals, and to promote virtuous and
ethical uses of technical skills also by guiding students towards possible
professional avenues for white hackers. 
C. University programmes and professional training should become more
interdisciplinary and include mandatory modules on psychological and
behavioural issues, as well as on legal, ethical, social, political and economic
issues, including those triggered by globalisation – with a particular focus
on specifc problems of the selected disciplinary feld. University students
and young professionals need the knowledge, skills and self-awareness
required to face the pressures and the anxieties (including performance
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anxiety) caused by the transition from adolescence to maturity and full
independence, in an extremely competitive and diverse academic and
professional world. 
D. Free access to adequate support should be ofered, in any possible
environment (schools, universities, workplaces), to anyone sufering from
mental health issues or psychological pressures of any kind. But free access
to such support is meaningless if those who might beneft from it do not
know it is available or are not willing to take it. Trough education and
widespread public information campaigns also online, governments should:
(i) inform the population of the available support and the ways to access it;
(ii) promote mental awareness and wellbeing as a valuable instrument of
personal development; (iii) contrast any stigmatisation or marginalisation of
those who sufer from any mental health issues or need any sort of support.
Te establishment of such a culture is also a fundamental step towards the
promotion of values of self-worth diferent than just fnancial success or
social prestige which can help mitigate the efects of anomie and strains. 
4.4. Community, identity, integration and thrill 
Te knowledge and skills promoted through education should be
complemented by specifc community-based initiatives to provide
citizens with instruments and opportunities to (i) form healthy personal
identities (beyond online ones); (ii) strengthen integration and inclusivity
by providing safe occasions of contact with diversity; (iii) corroborate a
sense of belonging not only to local communities but to one human society
and promote its fundamental values; (iv) gratify the need for thrill and
adventure. Such programmes should consist of diversifed social activities
– lectures, seminars, workshops, counselling and psychological support,
sporting groups, tourist trips, outdoor activities, festivals, social clubs etc.
Information campaigns should raise awareness on the benefts of an active
lifestyle, the associations between physical activity and mental wellbeing,
the pleasures of time spent ofine. Special events (awards, competitions,
workshops…) for hackers should be organised to acknowledge the societal
value of ethical hacking, encourage the development of computing skills
in risk-free environments and channel such skills into lawful activities.
Academia and industry should be involved through networking events
and open days to ofer hackers study and professional opportunities. Such
initiatives should be carefully planned and coordinated by national and local
authorities within a comprehensive national strategy aimed at achieving
minimum common objectives while addressing specifc local needs. 
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5. Conclusions: responsibilising the state through new notions 
of cybercrime and cybersecurity 
To efectively prevent cybercrime, intervening on technology alone is 
not enough. Strengthening cyber defences and restricting the access to 
certain technologies or computer targets might help reduce some instant 
criminal motivations and opportunities (proximate causes), but won’t afect 
the deeper global socio-psychological factors that trigger them, which we 
called remote causes of cybercrime. Tese must also be addressed. Although 
many remote causes, rooted as they are in the evolutions of globalisation, 
escape the immediate control of nation-states, there is much that national 
governments can do to can curb their criminogenic efects at a local level. 
Each state has the duty-responsibility to act at the best of their ability. Tis 
calls for quite a radical shif in perspective. 
In the frst place, there is a need for a more holistic approach. Te causes 
and forms of manifestation of cybercrime are so diverse that diversifed 
interventions are required. Tese include sophisticated social measures that 
might belong to areas of policy diferent than cybersecurity strictly considered. 
Some might be related to crime in general or to specifc categories of ofences 
that can also be commited through ICT (i.e. cyber-enabled ofences). Others, 
such social integration strategies, education and professional training 
or community programmes, might not even concern crime directly. 
Nevertheless, these should never be oblivious to the criminogenic aspects 
of the phenomena they address. Nor should cybersecurity strategies be 
ever oblivious to the impact of these policies on cybercrime prevention. 
Any cybersecurity policy should be closely coordinated with other relevant 
policies, including those addressing diferent but related crime types. 
Such a holistic approach implies a radical revision of the traditional notions 
of crime and cybercrime and cybersecurity. Reducing cybercrime – or any 
other global crime – to an evil to be fought, to malignant conduct determined 
by individual propensities or selfsh motives – such as greed, hate or revenge 
– means failing to grasp its human dimensions and the extraordinary 
complexity of its causes, which include considerable institutional and social 
failures. Such reductive conceptions lead to the deresponsibilisation of the 
state. By placing the burden of the responsibility for crime on the individual 
alone and forgeting the enormous responsibilities of the state and society 
in providing ideal conditions for individual wellbeing, they hinder the 
individuation of comprehensive preventive strategies. Tey foster antiquated, 
oversimplifed, stigmatising and antagonistic representations of crime which 
nurture the same irrational reactions – fear, anxiety, suspicion, xenophobia 
etc. – that motivate criminality and, eventually, undermine even the best 
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educational and social eforts to promote tolerance, diversity and solidarity 
and legality. It is urgent, therefore, to develop a socio-political understanding 
of crime as a complex human result of societal and environmental factors, 
ofen escaping individual control and ofen determined by the ineptitude of 
state policies or social norms. Te corollary of such a conception of crime is 
replacing any restrictive notion of cybersecurity as a set of infrastructural 
or technological defences with the idea that security is, frst and foremost, 
the realisation of equal societal conditions for individuals to lawfully fulfl 
their needs and ambitions. Te provision of opportunities, however, must be 
accompanied by the promotion of more meaningful goals of self-achievement 
consistent with the value of the human person, as expressed by fundamental 
rights and responsibilities. 
Te current global political climate, afected by waves of populism and 
nationalism, might appear hostile to the formation of a political will to 
embrace such revolutionary changes. How to persuade politicians and 
policymakers to do so? Te answer is knowledge. Te pre-condition for any 
shif in perspective and policy is the development of an interdisciplinary 
scientifc understanding of the human and social causes of cybercrime and 
global crime at large, possibly supported by empirical data. Investment in 
pluralistic international and comparative academic research is, therefore, 
paramount. But research alone is useless if it doesn’t permeate politics and 
practice. Te dialogue amongst academics, policymakers, lawmakers, public 
service, business and professionals should be strengthened. Education, 
training and information at all levels are required to develop more accurate 
institutional and social conceptions of cybercrime and its causes. Knowledge 
can also dissipate irrationality, fears and anxieties and support rational 
responses not only to cybercrime but to the rapid changes brought about 
by globalisation. Not everything lies therefore in the hands of politicians. 
Scholars, researchers, and intellectuals of all kinds have the responsibility 
to gain social trust by engaging with the public, the professions and the 
institutions of all kinds to develop scientifc knowledge, share it through 
accessible channels and put it at the service of society. 
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